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Economic Perspective 
TACKLMG LOUG TERM UNEMPLOYMENT - A PROPOSAL 
by Frank Kirwan 
The Problem 
In B r i t a i n during July of 1983 11% of a l l male c l a iman t s on the unemployment 
r e g i s t e r had been unemployed f o r a t l e a s t one y e a r . Over 60? had been 
unemployed for s ix months or more. The p ropor t ions for females were somewhat 
l o w e r , bu t one in fou r had been a c l a i m a n t fo r over one y e a r , w h i l e one in 
two had been a c l a iman t for a t l e a s t s ix months. The incidence of long term 
unemployment has been i n c r e a s i n g over t ime . In Ju ly of 1981 46$ of a l l men 
and women on t h e r e g i s t e r had been out of work fo r s i x months or more . Two 
y e a r s l a t e r t h e p r o p o r t i o n t h u s a f f e c t e d had i n c r e a s e d t o 58%. These a r e 
n a t i o n a l f i g u r e s and embrace p e o p l e of a l l a g e s . In some p a r t s of t h e 
country - t he West Midlands, North and North West of England - and amongst 
some age g roups - t h e over 35 ' s and p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e over 4 5 ' s - t h e 
p ropo r t i ons are s i g n i f i c a n t l y h igher . B r i t a i n i s not alone in facing such a 
long t e rm unemployment p rob l em, most of t h e member s t a t e s of t h e OECD a r e 
a f f e c t e d t o some d e g r e e . The p r o b l e m i s l i k e l y t o p e r s i s t f o r t h e 
f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e . Recent p r o j e c t i o n s by t h e OECD s e c r e t a r i a t s u g g e s t 
t h a t even a sus t a ined upturn would have l i t t l e impact on the s tock of long 
term unemployed over the remainder of t h i s decade. 
If a p r o p o s a l t o t a c k l e t h e problem i s not t o be r e j e c t e d out of hand i t 
must be f o r m u l a t e d in t h e l i g h t of e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s on t h e 
l e v e l of p u b l i c e x p e n d i t u r e . I t may w e l l be t h a t an i n c r e a s e in p u b l i c 
e x p e n d i t u r e would be an e f f e c t i v e way to r educe t h e p r e s e n t l e v e l of 
unemployment ; however such a c o u r s e of a c t i o n i s exc luded a t p r e s e n t and 
w i l l no t be c o n s i d e r e d h e r e . The p r o p o s a l o u t l i n e d below would no t i n c u r 
any a d d i t i o n a l p u b l i c e x p e n d i t u r e ; i n d e e d , i f i m p l e m e n t e d , i t shou ld 
d e l i v e r e x t r a t a x r e v e n u e s . Un l ike o t h e r schemes i t does no t r e q u i r e any 
"pump p r i m i n g " e x p e n d i t u r e by t h e s t a t e . Nor does i t r e q u i r e t h e s t a t e t o 
h i r e a d d i t i o n a l employees or in any way to engage in "make-work" a c t i v i t i e s . 
The p r o p o s a l a l s o has a n t i - i n f l a t i o n a r y , c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s - e n h a n c i n g and 
worksharing i m p l i c a t i o n s . 
The Proposal 
With t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of a c o m p u t e r i s e d s y s t e m f o r t h e p a y m e n t of 
unemployment b e n e f i t in 1982 i t has become p o s s i b l e t o c a l c u l a t e t h e 
expected dura t ion of unemployment for a person j o i n i n g the r e g i s t e r and the 
r e m a i n i n g e x p e c t e d d u r a t i o n fo r a person p a r t way t h r o u g h a s p e l l of 
unemployment . Such c a l c u l a t i o n s can be made fo r p a r t i c u l a r c l a s s e s of 
i n d i v i d u a l s c l a s s i f i e d by a g e , s e x , l o c a t i o n and t y p e of p r e v i o u s 
employment. These expected d u r a t i o n s can be rev i sed monthly or q u a r t e r l y 
as c o n d i t i o n s in t h e l a b o u r marke t change .* I t i s t h u s p o s s i b l e t o 
* See : "Unemployment Flows : New S t a t i s t i c s " Department of Employment 
Gazette , August 1983 pp.351-358 
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c a l c u l a t e t h e expec ted d i s b u r s e m e n t of unemployment and supp lemen ta ry 
b e n e f i t t o a p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l d u r i n g t h e r e m a i n d e r of h i s ( expec t ed ) 
s p e l l of unemployment. 
The p r o p o s a l i s t o a t t a c h to each pe r son who has been on t h e r e g i s t e r for a t 
l e a s t s ix months a weekly s u b s i d y equa l t o t he expec t ed d i s b u r s e m e n t of 
b e n e f i t s over the a n t i c i p a t e d remainder of h i s / h e r unemployment s p e l l . This 
subsidy would be payable to any firm h i r i n g the worker in quest ion under a 
con t rac t whose minimum dura t ion would be the expected remaining dura t ion of 
unemployment. A s i n g l e man in r e c e i p t of unemployment bene f i t would a t t r a c t 
a weekly subs idy of £25 , w h i l e someone on s u p p l e m e n t a r y b e n e f i t would 
a t t r a c t one of £20 .55 . For someone w i t h s e v e r a l dependen t s t he subs idy 
would be s i g n i f i c a n t l y g r e a t e r . The l a r g e s t s u b s i d i e s would o b v i o u s l y 
a t t a c h to t h o s e c l a s s e s of worker whose c o n t i n u e d unemployment i s most 
expensive to s t a t e . Amongst these would be low s k i l l e d workers in depressed 
r eg ions , those with l a r g e numbers of dependents, and those aged over 45. A 
suggest ion of t h i s na tu r e has some p receden t s , s i m i l a r payments, but l i m i t e d 
to £1000, are a v a i l a b l e under the En te rp r i s e Allowance Scheme to unemployed 
persons a t t empt ing to become sel f -employed, while the Young Worker Scheme 
provides a subsidy of up to £15 per week. 
The proposal would produce no immediate f a l l in spending on unemployment and 
s u p p l e m e n t a r y b e n e f i t s . However, government r e v e n u e s should r i s e as the 
unemployed taken on by f i rms begin to pay income tax and na t iona l insurance 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s . F i rms h i r i n g t h e s u b s i d i s e d w o r k e r s would f i nd average 
labour cos t s lower than before , and would become more compet i t ive on both 
home and export markets . There would thus be an i ncen t i ve for p a r t i c i p a t i n g 
f i rms to expand output . If B r i t a i n were the only country implementing such 
a proposal the t r ade balance would be favourably a f fec ted . With production 
cos t s thus p a r t i a l l y underwr i t t en by the wage subsidy i n f l a t i o n a r y p ressures 
would be r educed . I n c r e a s e d p r o f i t s would a c c r u e t o p a r t i c i p a t i n g f i r m s , 
reducing t h e i r borrowing needs, thus pu t t i ng downward p ressu re on i n t e r e s t 
r a t e s and the r a t e of growth of the money supply. 
I m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e p r o p o s a l o u t l i n e d h e r e would a c t i v e l y promote 
w o r k s h a r i n g and promote i t in an e f f i c i e n t manner by a c t i n g th rough the 
range of wage r a t e s facing employers. With subs id ised labour a v a i l a b l e from 
the unemployment r e g i s t e r t he i n c e n t i v e to employ e x i s t i n g l a b o u r on 
overt ime hours would be reduced, though not e l imina ted . Such wage subs id i e s 
would c o u n t e r t he t endency of e x i s t i n g measures t o r educe t he p r i c e of 
c a p i t a l r e l a t i v e t o t h a t of l a b o u r and would t a r g e t a s s i s t a n c e on t h o s e 
p a r t s of the country and those c l a s s e s of i nd iv idua l on whom the burden of 
long term unemployment bears most heav i ly . 
Some Objections 
The most immed ia t e o b j e c t i o n t o t h e p r o p o s a l i s t h e b u r e a u c r a t i c one of 
u n w o r k a b i l i t y . With modern h igh speed compute r s such an o b j e c t i o n i s 
far from unsurmountable. The proposal could be implemented through the tax 
and n a t i o n a l i n s u r a n c e sys t em. The r e q u i r e d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a r r a n g e m e n t s 
a l r e a d y e x i s t in t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e Temporary Shor t Time Working 
Compensat ion Scheme and the now d e f u n c t S p e c i a l Temporary Employment 
Program. 
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I t would also be objected that implementation of the proposal would lead to 
the displacement of e x i s t i n g workers. To counter t h i s objec t ion the wage 
subsidy would only be payable in respect of recru i t s who represented a net 
inc rease in the h i r i ng f i rm 's l eve l of employment. Firms could s t i l l in 
theory f i r e N existing employees and hi re N + 1 subsidised workers from the 
unemployment r e g i s t e r and continue within the l e t t e r of the law. The 
existence of t ra ining cos ts , trade unions and redundancy payments make such 
a course of action somewhat unlikely on a large scale. 
Some of the subsidised workers would undoubtedly be fired when the i r subsidy 
period had expired. Evidence from exist ing schemes, such as the former Youth 
Opportunities Program, which subsidise some types of labour suggest that a 
s ignif icant proportion of employees hired under such a scheme are retained 
when the subsidy ceases . But even i f a l l were f i red at the end of t h e i r 
subsidy period the outcome would s t i l l be p re fe rab le to the present one. 
Those employed, a lbe i t temporarily, would have enjoyed higher incomes for 
the duration and would have been gainfully employed rather than remaining 
unemployed.. 
When h i r i n g , employers would have an obvious tendency to d i s c r im ina t e 
aga ins t unsubsidised a p p l i c a n t s or those with a r e l a t i v e l y small subsidy. 
Would the proposal not therefore create a new class of long term unemployed? 
No. One of the a t t r a c t i o n s of the scheme i s t ha t those thus d i sc r imina ted 
aga ins t would in t ime find t h a t the subsidy a t tached to them had become 
re la t ive ly large in consequence of such discrimination. By contrast , those 
workers for whom the scheme had achieved i t s end would find t h a t , should 
they re-enter unemployment, the prospective subsidy attached to them would 
be correspondingly smaller ref lect ing the i r improved position in the labour 
market. In effect the proposed system i s a self equi l ibrat ing one. 
Conclusions 
To sum up, the proposed scheme would "price people in to jobs" as the 
government puts i t . The net effect on the headline to ta l of unemployment 
would be g rea t e r than i f the same expenditure were incurred on general 
reflat ionary measures since secondary workers would not be a t t racted into 
the labour market by the proposal ou t l ined here but would be by general 
ref la t ion . Present and prospective levels of long term unemployment are 
in to lerable , but fa i lu re to attempt to redress them is equally in tolerable , 
especially when measures exis t which are not inconsistent with the general 
thrust of government policy and which would have a favourable overall impact 
on the incidence of long term joblessness. 
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